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“And they always find in archaeology, ​a series of small walls​… ‘we’ve found a series of small                 
walls, we’re very excited, we think this proves they had walls in olden days. They were very                 
small, a series of small-walled people.’ And someone comes along, very learned with glasses              
and says ‘of course the king and queen entertained here—1500 courtiers—and there were             
soldiers, 20,000 soldiers in this room, and elephants dancing hopscotch over there, mad fiddler              
in this room, playing the banjo, viaducts and aqueducts etc…’ And you’re just watching              
thinking ​you’re making this up, mate – you just point at a series of small walls and say ​‘and                   
Tutenkhamen played the banjo in there’. Don’t know if it’s true!” 
- Eddie Izzard, ​Glorious 
 
Archaeology is hard. The remains of human cultural pasts; pottery, middens, coins, burials,             
‘small walls’—the leftover stuff—potentially underwrite vivid narratives about the lives of           
peoples and societies long departed. But between a few scraps of bone and cloth, faded               
knick-knacks, the subtle traces of long-departed wooden structures, and a complex,           
flourishing community replete with ideologies, religions and social structures, there lies a            
considerable inferential gap. 
How archaeologists navigate this gap is the subject of Robert Chapman and Alison Wylie’s              
new book, ​Evidential Reasoning in Archaeology ​. It’s a short read of just over 200 pages               
spanning four chapters (plus introduction and conclusion), but this brevity is no sign of a lack                
of subtlety, richness or importance: Chapman and Wylie provide a sophisticated and            
philosophically informed account of the nature of archaeology. I’ll explain their central            
argument, provide a quick tour, and then switch to a more critical discussion. 
The book is framed by the ‘paradox of material evidence’ ​. The historical record is              
impoverished, and thus potentially egregiously theory-laden. That is, our preconceived ideas           
about the past could determine our interpretation of material remains, leading to what Martin              
Bell (2015) calls ‘xeroxing’: our pre-understandings force interpretations of traces, which           
circularly support those pre-understandings. Nonetheless,Chapman and Wylie impress upon         
us “… how stubbornly recalcitrant these data can be, no matter how entrenched their assumed               
meaning...” (5) So, material evidence is ambiguous; nonetheless it can be transformative. 
A secondary framing concerns the ‘crisis debates’ which mark archaeology’s theoretical           
history: on Chapman and Wylie’s account (a history Wylie has told before, e.g., Wylie 1985)               
archaeologists have tended to bounce between two extremes. At one extreme is a hard-nosed              
super-empiricism which attempts to maintain archaeology’s ‘objectivity’ by restricting it to           
the mere cataloging of material remains, or by only making the most conservative, careful              
inferences. At the other extreme is a kind of free-wheeling subjectivist constructivism where             
interpretation reigns supreme, with few restrictions (empirical or otherwise) to constrain it.            
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These crisis debates are related to the paradox of material evidence: on one horn of a                
dilemma we demand solid foundations for archaeological evidence, and thus are           
conservative; on the other horn we deny solid foundations, thus opening the door to              
unconstrained interpretive speculation. 
How is the paradox of material evidence resolved? Chapman and Wylie’s diagnosis rejects             
the assumption that archaeological reasoning requires fundamental grounds. Instead, they          
argue that the very success of archaeology depends on adopting, and revising, ‘provisional’             
grounds. This allows progress in the face of limited material evidence, while letting that              
evidence be transformative. 
Wylie’s colleague at Durham University, Nancy Cartwright, has some advice for           
philosophical argumentation which I think neatly captures what Chapman and Wylie think            
about archaeological reasoning:  
“…from the very start of my career as an undergraduate at Pittsburgh I have opposed: Tall,                
skinny arguments that are sparse and tidy. In favor of arguments that are: Short, stocky, and                
tangled.” (Cartwright 2015, 101) 
Tall, skinny arguments begin from some fundamental ground and move carefully and            
deductively to their conclusions. They are, in some sense, self-warranting. Such arguments            
are not robust—knock out a premise and the whole edifice collapses (and the more premises,               
the more liable to collapse!). Arguments that are short, stocky and tangled, by contrast, draw               
upon a variety of evidence with differing grounds, which are interwoven and interdependent.             
This makes for robustness: even if some aspects fall by the wayside, the argument marches               
on. These are not self-warranting, lacking a single foundation, and what foundations they do              
have are provisional, open to continual probing. Regardless of whether Cartwright has it right              
for philosophers (I reckon she has), according to Chapman and Wylie, archaeology has that              
same character. 
“Neither these data nor the evidential claims based on them constitute a self-warranting             
empirical foundation, and yet they can powerfully challenge and constrain the reconstructive            
and explanatory claims we project onto the cultured past” (Chapman and Wylie,            
6).Foundations are provisional, but nonetheless underwrite robust arguments due to their           
diversity and their interrelations.  
In a sense, this answer to the paradox of material evidence is straightforward, and not new:                
archaeologists uncover the past using ‘variety of evidence’ reasoning, and by continually            
critiquing, developing and improving their techniques for generating those lines of evidence.            
Indeed, to some extent the book summarizes and builds upon many of the ideas in Chapman                
and Wylie’s recent edited collection (Chapman and Wylie 2014), ideas which Wylie has             
explored throughout her career. But this straightforward answer belies the rich, complex            
reasoning and infrastructure of actual archaeology—and it is this which the book captures             
originally and convincingly. With vivid examples from both contemporary and historical           
archaeological practice, Chapman and Wylie analyze the successes (and failures) of the            
science, and from it draw a series of lessons about what good archaeology looks like.  
The central idea is that archaeology’s success involves the construction, and ongoing            
development, of various kinds of scaffolds. The notion of a ‘scaffold’ is becoming common              
parlance in philosophy of science (see, for instance, Caporael et al 2013). What is a scaffold                
in this context? Well, scientific theories and evidence don’t stand alone, but rely on various               
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kinds of institutional, material and epistemic supports. Indeed, such supports are often            
contingent, and provisional, and hence, subject to ongoing re-evaluation and tweaking.           
Important for Chapman and Wylie are scaffolds as ‘provisional foundations’—such scaffolds           
licence the interpretation of a set of material remains as serious evidence for a claim about                
our cultural past. But there are other scaffolds too. For example, Chapman and Wylie              
emphasize the various techniques, best practices, and ‘ways-of-seeing’ that scaffold          
investigation (as opposed to, say, knowledge) and hence are necessary for effective field             
work, the preparation and analysis of material remains, pedagogy, and other features            
necessary for archaeology to succeed. Finally, community structures scaffold the          
investigation in that they facilitate the communication, trading and ‘data-journeys’ (Leonelli           
2016) necessary for such collaborative, non-self-warranting work: it takes a village to            
reconstruct a village’s past. 
Allow me to pause briefly and mention some disquiet with ‘scaffolding’ as an analogy              
(inspired by Kirsten Walsh’s discussion (under review)). An architectural scaffold isn’t such            
simply because it supports, but because it is not a proper part of the completed               
structure—often, a scaffold is removed ​at or before completion. However, for Chapman and             
Wylie it’s not obvious that there is a completed ​product for archaeology, or at least their                
strong emphasis on the dynamism of archaeological theorizing and its relationship with            
material evidence suggests there isn’t. Moreover, it isn’t clear that archaeological scaffolds            
are removable, or separate to the ‘building’: although the scaffolds might be removed or at               
least altered, it isn’t part of their function to be so. 
Regardless, the provisioning of local warrants—provisional foundations—and their continual         
dialogue with material evidence, demonstrates how “The ‘ladening’ of archaeological claims           
with ‘theory’… need not be viciously circular, a matter of projecting just what you want to                
see onto an obligingly accommodating screen of enigmatic, empirical data” (Chapman and            
Wylie, 206). 
The book’s structure hammers these lessons home via analyses of four aspects of             
archaeological practice. The first chapter provides an historical overview of the crisis debates             
I mentioned above. Chapman and Wylie argue that such debates matter for day-to-day             
archaeology. However, when we consider what archaeologists actually do, I think it is             
striking how small the effects of these extreme quasi-philosophical views seem to be.             
Chapman and Wylie’s book explains this: the combination of stubborn material evidence, and             
the ongoing re-evaluating, tweaking and critiquing of provisional foundations, leads          
archaeological practice to be relatively unscathed by the highfalutin methodological          
theorizing they sometimes engage in. That is, crisis debates have little effect on             
archaeological practice, and this is because they focus on the kinds of foundational issues              
which  are not where the epistemic action is. 
The second chapter considers fieldwork. Chapman and Wylie provide a clear articulation of             
the centrality of fieldwork to archaeology and its theoretical nature. Their discussion is             
important simply for covering this ground (philosophers need to think more about            
fieldwork!). Again, the approach is historical: we are treated to a beautiful, complex             
discussion of the scaffolding involved in developing the techniques and standardizations           
required for archaeological fieldwork to, well, work. The importance and dangers of such             
scaffolds are highlighted, the central challenge being to keep them “… accountable to the              
goals of inquiry and to an evolving array of conceptual and empirical constraints” (86). Given               
the importance of fieldwork in archaeological training, I suspect much more remains to be              
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said about how these shared experiences structure not just how archaeologist learn “… to              
‘see’ material traces as archaeological data…” (84), but how archaeologists ​think​: theorize,            
explain and interpret. 
The third chapter covers legacy data: archaeologists frequently need to re-examine material            
evidence and data collected many years ago, by workers operating under very different             
conditions and with different ideas about what good data collection and evidence looks like.              
Such practices make particularly vivid the kinds of reflective ‘source-criticism’ (the           
“…dynamic process of… refining provisional foundations” (10)) which underwrites         
archaeological success. It is thus a clear illustration of Chapman & Wylie’s central point              
about the non-foundational nature of archaeological knowledge. 
Chapter four examines the archaeological practice of incorporating ‘external’ resources from           
other disciplines—most obviously the use of carbon 14 dating. Here, it is argued that              
archaeologists do not simply adopt tools and techniques from other disciplines. Rather, there             
is a long, hard journey getting resources from other domains to play nice with the highly                
idiosyncratic, localized—​difficult​—stuff that is archaeological evidence. This difficulty is         
reflected in the historical pattern Chapman and Wylie highlight and illustrate using the case              
of ​14​C. First, as the new technique is bought to archaeology, we see a period of optimism                 
coupled with a kind of imperialism. ​14​C dating was hailed as a way of finally providing                
firm—objective—grounds for what were previously speculative, messy attempts to estimate          
how old stuff is. Second, we enter a kind of crisis period, where the promise of the new                  
technique is found to have been overplayed, and a process of calibrating to the local, complex                
requirements of archaeology begins. Finally, in the third phase, the new process is absorbed              
into archaeological practice. It becomes an aspect of archaeology itself and, crucially, is             
treated as just another line of evidence—no fundamental priority is granted. The new             
technique, and the new evidence it provides, shifts from being a silver bullet (phase 1), to                
being problematized and adapted (phase 2), to being part of the day-to-day archaeological             
toolkit (phase 3).  
Phases 2 and 3, I think, undermine a common perception about how methods are traded               
between scientific fields. Old habits of hierarchical thinking die hard, and how we treat the               
co-option of work from physics and chemistry into the so-called ‘softer’ sciences is             
influenced by this. It is often painted as if the physicists have uncovered some fundamental               
feature of the way the world works, and this luckily can be used by the grateful archaeologist                 
to, in this instance, date various objects. Somehow ownership for the techniques still lies              
within physics​. But recognizing how difficult this kind of trade is, and the extent to which it                 
must be transformed, molded and ​localized ​to archaeological contexts, challenges this           
picture. ​14​C dating is not ​a technique from physics which archaeologists use. Rather,             
archaeological ​14​C dating is an archaeological ​technique which was enabled—in part—by           
some advances in physics. 
In my view, ​Evidential Reasoning in Archaeology contributes to three broad discussions.            
Perhaps most importantly, its clarity and closeness to practice should make excellent fodder             
for the internal discussions in archaeology into which Chapman and Wylie interject. I would              
hope that exposure to the ideas in this book would put to bed the dichotomizing debates                
which partly motivate it. Chapman and Wylie demonstrate that thinking that archaeology            
must embrace either the Scylla of enforced ‘objectivity’—merely cataloging finds, or the            
Charybdis of unconstrained speculative interpretation, is a deep mistake. Archaeologists          
successfully interpret the cultural past from meager remains because they can systematically            
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interpret finds.  
Second, Chapman and Wylie’s discussion is in implicit dialogue with the philosophy of             
historical reconstruction. their focus on practice--the social and technological preconditions          
required for archaeological work, for instance--provides an important counterpart to the more            
abstract approaches of philosophers such as Derek Turner and Carol Cleland. Indeed, where             
history’s destructive tendency often leads Turner to be rather pessimistic of our capacity to              
uncover the past (Turner, 2007), and Cleland is often rather optimistic because of the past’s               
leaving varied, disparate evidence (2002, 2011), Chapman and Wylie provide a balanced            
analysis of the conditions under which success can occur. This kind of localized,             
context-sensitive approach strikes me as a fruitful way forwards. 
Third, the book is a fine example of a strategy for understanding science which emerges at                
the intersection of analytic philosophy, integrated history and philosophy of science, and            
science and technology studies. Often this philosophy identifies itself in terms of ‘practice’:             
instead of focusing on the outputs of scientific work such as theories or hypotheses, they               
investigate the processes which produce them. Chapman and Wylie draw generously from            
thinkers in this tradition, including Helen Longino, Hasok Chang, Bill Wimsatt, Peter            
Galison and others (indeed, Wylie herself has a long history of this kind of work). Moreover,                
the book doesn’t simply co-opt, but often extends this philosophical program—particularly in            
the discussion of objectivity in the conclusion and, as I’ll turn to now, potentially in how                
trading zones reveal themselves in archaeology. 
What is a ‘trading zone’? Trading zones involve methodological, evidential, or perhaps            
institutional overlap which necessitates the passing of information—techniques, best         
practices, etc…—between scientists with otherwise diverging interests or specializations. As          
Peter Galison has put it, a trading zone is “… an arena in which radically different activities                 
could be ​locally, but not globally, coordinated” (1993, 190). The currency of trading zones,              
then, are divergent but useful techniques for a common purpose, or mutually useful             
techniques for different purposes. 
The notion of ‘trading zone’ is fairly amorphous, and certainly a loose, broad sense fits               
archaeology very well—indeed Chapman and Wylie use it to frame much of their discussion.              
However, it strikes me that there is a tension between the thought that trading zones are                
central to archaeology, and Chapman and Wylie’s story of how ‘external’ resources are used              
by archaeologists. Recall that this involves three stages: the new technique is heralded as              
capable of replacing the unstable, speculative ways of the past; the technique loses its silver               
sheen and a period of calibration begins; the technique is integrated or absorbed. In the end,                
the technique, calibrated and adapted to the conditions of archaeology, becomes just another             
line of evidence to be considered. Where is the tension? The more that the second and third                 
stages involve transforming the techniques, knowledge or technology into the local context of             
archaeology, the less those techniques are the property of a trading zone – currency traded               
between fields—and the more they become a part of archaeology proper. In other words, the               
more the trade is ​absorbed​, the less it looks like a trading zone—like an overlap between two                 
fields—and the more it looks like co-option. By the third stage, the trading zone has               
disappeared, as the technique has simply become the furniture of archaeological research. 
This tension, I think, brings lessons in tow. One is that—and this should be              
unsurprising—trading zones are often transient, they can be a stage a field moves through              
prior to full incorporation of the technique. Another is the importance of keeping             
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communication lines open after the trading zone has lapsed. Chapman and Wylie articulate             
the importance of communication and respect (in Chang’s 2004 sense) between different            
scientific domains, which is necessary for the kinds of fruitful integration characteristic of             
good archaeology. To the extent that some techniques such as carbon-dating become            
divorced from their original homes while being transformed and absorbed into archaeology,            
the understanding that a working physicist might bring into the equation could be lost.              
Plausibly, practicing physicists have knowledge about some aspects of the relevant processes            
which archaeologists do not. It might be a good thing that the marriage of the trading zone                 
breaks down—if the technique really must be so transformed to local archaeological            
conditions—but it might nonetheless be a very good idea to grant physics visitation rights to               
its estranged children. 
Chapman and Wylie’s book on evidential reasoning is very much focused on reasoning from              
material objects. And this isn’t surprising: such a perspective is writ into the very title of                
Wylie’s earlier essay collection ​Thinking from Things ​(2002). The paradox which frames the             
collection is about the stubbornness of objects; and indeed archaeology does involve intense             
and careful interaction with, preparation of, and interpretation of, the pasts’ physical            
remnants. However, I’m inclined to think they give the role of less tangible             
things—imagination and storytelling—short-shrift in their account (although whether this is a           
sin of omission or commission I’m not sure). In Chapman and Wylie’s work it often comes                
across as if theories and hypotheses are dangerous things, threatening to lead us astray—to              
the sin of xeroxing!—and would do so, were it not for the heroic stubbornness of physical                
objects, and the acquiescence of archaeologists in letting them speak. And, of course, such              
dangers are very real.  
However, I think an important – perhaps a central – scaffold in reconstructing the past               
involves narratives, theorizing and scenario-building. Such practices allow us to situate our            
lower-level interpretations of material remains—they help us decide what is salient and what             
isn’t about those remains. And this matters for two reasons. First, working out what is               
evidentially relevant and what isn’t for a historical reconstruction is extremely tricky. By             
articulating and testing scenarios we can identify evidential relevance (Currie 2015). Second,            
narratives—our picture of the past—can themselves act as evidence. If our understanding of             
the processes and events operating in the past is particularly rich, then the restrictions on what                
counts as a good, coherent, narrative become increasingly strict. That is to say, ‘coherency’              
becomes much more than a mere matter of logical consistency, but makes the generating of a                
scenario that fits our pre-existing knowledge a true epistemic achievement (Currie 2016,            
Currie and Sterelny 2017). So, I suspect that scenario-building deserves a place alongside the              
co-option of external resources, and the development of theory connecting material remains            
to the past, and the techniques, theory and practices for fieldwork, as part of the essential                
scaffolding—in fact the furniture—of successful archaeology.  
And so, although archaeology is hard, the impression that it amounts to pointing at small               
walls and making things up is far from accurate. Chapman and Wylie demonstrate that              
archaeological success is underwritten by the continual practice of developing epistemic           
scaffolding, and bringing those scaffolds into contact with the intransigence of material            
remains, and by maintaining the social and institutional structures required for the exchange             
of ideas and techniques. This continual tweaking and the physicality of remains allows             
archaeology to often succeed in the systematic—scientific—reconstruction of cultural         
prehistory. 
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